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Complementarity among International Asset Holdings: 
Do Banks Have a Special Role? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper studies the pattern and structure of cross-border bilateral financial asset 
holdings. By utilizing an extended dataset and employing a variant of gravity models, 
we find strong evidence for the presence of complementarities among bank loans, short- 
and long-term debts, and portfolio equity holdings. The complementarities can be 
explained by common factors of standard gravity models such as economy size, state of 
development, and information cost proxies, as well as bilateral trade in goods and 
services. However, we also find the presence of a direct channel of complementarities 
among financial asset holdings that cannot be explained by these gravity factors. We 
proceed to investigate whether the complementarities can be characterized by the 
models that predict a special role of banks in alleviating information asymmetry. We 
find supporting evidence for this hypothesis in that international bank lending tends to 
increase the volume of portfolio asset holdings. This acceleration effect of bank lending 
is stronger for destination countries with higher degrees of ‘law and order,’ which 
suggests that cross-border bank lending may not lead to capital market integration, 
despite reduced information cost, if there is no appropriate infrastructure to facilitate 
portfolio investment. By investigating the structure of bilateral asset holdings, we also 
find positive evidence for the information role of banks. The share of bank lending 
decreases with increasing state of development of destination countries measured by per 
capita GDP and human capital accumulation, but increases with increasing distance, 
suggesting that information cost may play an important role in determining the structure 
of cross-border asset holdings. 
 
JEL Classification No: F15, F36 
 
Keywords: Cross-border asset holdings, Financial integration, Bank lending 
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I. Introduction 
 
With capital account regulations being substantially lifted around the world, 
international financial integration has progressed markedly over the last decade. The 
pattern of international financial integration is, however, not homogeneous across either 
different levels of development or economic regions. While the financial integration 
with developing economies remains mainly in the form of bank lending, international 
capital flows have become increasingly disintermediated for developed economies. Kim 
et al., (2005) also find that the regional financial integration in East Asia is especially 
pronounced in bank lending and that, compared to Europe, East Asia tends to be 
relatively more linked to global financial markets rather than being integrated within the 
region. 
 Will this unequal progress of international financial integration persist? This 
paper tries to answer this question by investigating whether different forms of cross-
border capital flows are mutually reinforcing. If there are strong complementarities 
among different forms of international financial integration, we can expect that the 
currently biased pattern of financial integration will eventually be corrected by the 
complete development of various types of financial integration.  
 We use a gravity model that is more widely used in the international trade 
literature as a benchmark model for financial asset transactions. Recently, the gravity 
model has been proved useful in explaining trade in both financial assets and goods. 
Distance, which plays a crucial role as an explanatory variable in the gravity model, is 
presupposed as a proxy for transaction costs. Hence bilateral trade in goods is expected 
to be strongly negatively correlated with the distance between countries, which is also 
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confirmed empirically. Since trade in financial assets is not associated with large 
transaction costs, at least not proportional to the geographical distance, the success of 
the gravity model in explaining financial transactions was rather unexpected. Portes and 
Rey (2000) responded to this puzzling finding by arguing that the significant negative 
impact of distance on financial transactions results from the fact that distance is largely 
a proxy for information asymmetries. They also found that the geography of 
information is the main determinant of the pattern of cross-border equity flows while 
there is little support for diversification or return chasing motives being influential.1 
Employing a variant of gravity models, Ghosh and Wolf (1999), Portes et al. (2001), 
Kawai and Liu (2001), and Shin and Yang (2006) also report empirical evidence 
supporting the importance of geographical distance and information cost as important 
determinants of international capital flows and asset holdings. 
 By adding other types of financial asset holdings as additional explanatory 
variables to an otherwise standard gravity model, we test for the existence of 
complementarities among different types of financial integration. For example, we set 
up a gravity model for bank loans and add other types of financial asset holdings such 
as short- and long-term debts and portfolio equity holdings. We find that even after 
controlling for standard gravity factors such as economy size and distance, the 
coefficients of other types of financial asset holdings remain statistically significant, 
indicating that a deeper integration through other types of financial assets may induce 
further financial integration in bank lending. When we switch the roles in the regression 
                                                 
1 Tesar and Werner (1995) also investigate the home bias in international portfolio allocation decisions 
and suggest that geographic proximity may be an important factor for this home bias due to institutional 
differences and the cost of obtaining information in foreign markets. 
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equation between bank loans and other types of financial asset holdings, we find that the 
coefficient of bank loans is also statistically significant, suggesting that bank lending 
accelerates other types of financial integration as well. The robustness of this finding is 
confirmed by replacing current explanatory variables with lagged ones and/or by adding 
a lagged value of the dependent variable and bilateral trade in goods as additional 
explanatory variables.  
While it would be intriguing to provide a rationale for the existence of the 
mutually reinforcing, bilateral complementarities between bank loans and other types of 
financial assets, in this paper we instead pay attention to the special role of banks in 
accelerating other forms of financial integration. According to the banking literature, 
banks play an important role in reducing the agency cost associated with external 
financing. Diamond (1984) for instance, argues that banks have an advantage over 
outside investors because they know more about the borrowers’ prospects as the insider 
position of banks allows them to overcome the information asymmetry. Namely, banks 
screen prospective borrowers and continuously monitor the debt service capacity of 
borrowers. By doing so, banks produce valuable private information that is not readily 
available in public capital markets. As a result of the diminished adverse selection and 
reduced moral hazard, borrowers’ access to banks’ informed fund yields a positive 
signal to external financiers such as arm’s-length capital. Consequently, the approval of 
a bank loan may send a signal to the capital market that all claims of higher priority may 
be safe. Therefore, a positive loan renewal or increased volume of bank lending may 
induce other, limited-information investors to invest even in a situation with large 
information asymmetry. That is, there is a sequential complementarity between bank 
lending and capital market funding (Diamond 1991). 
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While there exists a volume of research on this certification effect of bank lending 
at the domestic firm level, relatively fewer studies are available that investigate the 
evidence on the international front.2 For example, Hull and Tesar (2001) report that the 
shares of bank loans and foreign direct investment tend to fall as economies develop, 
presumably due to declining information costs. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) also 
find a positive relationship between the degree of financial development and portfolio 
investments. Using a cross sectional data set, Buch (2002) investigates whether the 
recent trend toward disintermediation of international capital flows, namely from bank 
financing to bond financing, has resulted from the declining information cost, and finds 
mixed evidence: while the development of an economy lowers the share of bank loans 
relative to bond financing, the geographical distance between a lender and a borrower is 
negatively associated with the share of bank loan, contrary to the prediction of 
information explanations. 
In this paper, we also seek to find evidence of a special role of banks in 
alleviating asymmetric information problems in the international financial structure in 
the following three ways. First, when we estimate a gravity model for short- and long-
term debts and portfolio equities, if we add bank loans as an additional explanatory 
variable, the estimated coefficients of the information cost proxy variables such as 
                                                 
2 James (1987) for instance finds that announcements of loans by banks increase the stock market value 
of the borrowing firms in his event study for U.S. firms. Lummer and McConnell (1989) distinguish new 
loans and loan renewals, and report that loan renewals generate positive stock market effects while new 
loans demonstrate no significant effect. Hoshi et al. (1993) show that bank lending exposes borrowers to 
monitoring which serves as a certification device that facilitates capital market funding. For evidence in 
Korea, Hahm and Kang (2005) find that while an increase in bank lending tends to raise stock prices 
subsequently for small and medium-sized firms, it does not lead to increased volume of bond financing. 
All these studies have in common a focus on domestic issues. 
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distance, border and common language are substantially reduced. This reduced effect of 
information cost suggests that bank loans may influence the degree of information 
asymmetry and thereby weaken the impact of information cost on other asset holdings.  
Second, following Buch’s approach, we try to investigate if the share of bank 
loans in total bilateral asset holdings is related with the degree of information 
asymmetry across countries and over time. We find that the share of bank loans is 
negatively related with per capita GDPs of both source and destination countries, as 
well as with human capital accumulation, which indicates that as the economy develops 
countries tend to invest and receive other forms of financial assets relatively more than 
bank loans.  On the other hand the distance variable is positively related with bank 
loan shares, implying that bank lending becomes more important relative to other 
portfolio investments in external financing with increasing distance between the 
countries.3 Given that distance proxies for information asymmetry between countries, 
this finding also supports the information view that banks may play a special role even 
in international context. 
Third, we test for the possibility that cross-border bank lending leads to 
subsequent capital market integrations only in the presence of adequate capital market 
infrastructure such as a legal system to facilitate portfolio investments in capital markets. 
The existence of this potential non-linear effect of bank lending is tested by including an 
interaction term between bank lending and the degree of ‘law and order’ - a proxy 
                                                 
3 This finding is contrasted with Buch (2002) that showed that the geographical distance between a 
lender and a borrower is negatively associated with the share of bank loans. We believe that the 
difference is mainly due to the different regression approaches: while Buch relied on cross sectional 
information only based on data in year 1997, we used additional data in the three years from 2001 to 2003 
and hence estimated the model in a panel regression setting.     
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variable to the development of relevant infrastructure. We find that the coefficient of the 
interaction term is significantly positive, which is consistent with our conjecture that the 
acceleration effect of international bank lending on other forms of asset holdings is 
stronger for destination countries with higher degrees of legal infrastructure 
development.  
The present study is differentiated from existing literature in several ways. First, 
we use an extended panel dataset of cross-border bilateral asset holdings consisting of 
5,940 observations involving 22 source countries and four years: 1997, 2001, 2002 and 
2003. Second, we investigate the complementarity among various forms of asset 
holdings by estimating the elasticity of a specific type of asset holding with respect to 
another type of asset holding within a gravity model framework which enables us to 
control for the impacts of other standard gravity factors. We also test for the presence of 
complementarity by explicitly considering bilateral trade in goods and services as well 
as the lagged effect of dependent variables. Finally, we investigate potential non-linear 
effects of international bank lending by estimating the interaction effect between bank 
lending and other determinants of capital flows such as ‘law and order’ of destination 
countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the data and basic 
correlation structure among different forms of asset holdings are explained. Section 3 
presents regression results of complementarities among cross-border asset holdings 
within the framework of a gravity model. Section 4 addresses the special role of 
international bank lending. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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II. Patterns of International Asset Holdings 
 
1. Data 
 
We need data on cross-border bilateral financial transactions to investigate the pattern of 
cross-border asset holdings. The most widely used data on international portfolio asset 
holdings is the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) published by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF conducted surveys on international 
portfolio asset holdings for the first time in 1997 and annually since 2001. The first 
CPIS involved 20 economies and was expanded to 67 source economies including 
several offshore and financial centers in 2001. The portfolio asset holdings consist of 
three components: short-term debts, long-term debts, and equities. The bilateral 
positions of asset holdings of the source countries in 223 destination countries and 
territories are reported in the dataset.4  
In our study, the CPIS dataset is supplemented with the dataset on international 
bank claims reported to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). It is the 
consolidated international bank claims of BIS-reporting banks by nationality of lenders 
and borrowers. We gathered these data for 22 reporting countries from the BIS 
Quarterly Review.5 While the data are available from 1983 on a biannual basis, most 
countries began to report comprehensive bilateral data from 1999. The data set covers 
more than 200 destination countries and territories. 
Other data were obtained from more standard sources. The bilateral trade data 
                                                 
4 Please refer to the IMF website http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm for detailed description 
of the CPIS dataset. 
5 For detailed descriptions of the dataset, refer to the website http://www.bis.org/statistics/histstats10.htm. 
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were collected from the Directions of Trade dataset. The data for GDP and population 
were obtained from the International Financial Statistics. The human capital data were 
obtained from Barro and Lee (2001) and the law and order data from the International 
Country Risk Guide.6 We also obtained data for other variables used in the standard 
gravity equation from the dataset provided by Rose.7 The summary statistics for the 
data used in our estimation are described in Table 1. 
 
2. The Intensities of Cross-border Asset Holdings 
 
To characterize the pattern of cross-border bilateral asset holdings, we construct a 
measure of intensity for financial asset transactions. The intensity measure for a specific 
financial asset indicates the share held by a destination country out of the total asset 
holdings of a source country for the specific asset. Since bank lending data are available 
only in the form of stock data, we construct intensity measures for bank loan, short-term 
debt, long-term debt, and equity holdings using stock data as follows: 
 
loanint sdtsdt
st
l
L
= , stdint sdtsdt
st
std
STD
= , ltdint sdtsdt
st
ltd
LTD
= , and eqint sdtsdt
st
eq
EQ
=  
 
where sdtl , sdtstd , sdtltd  and sdteq  are the bank loans, short-term debt, long-term debt, 
and equity, respectively, held by the source country s in the destination country d at time 
t. tL , tSTD , tLTD  and tEQ  are the total amounts of bank loans, short-term debts, 
                                                 
6 For details on the International Country Risk Guide, refer to the website, http://www.icrgonline.com. 
7 The dataset is available at the website, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/, maintained by Andrew 
Rose. 
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long-term debts, and equities, respectively, held by the source country s at time t.  
Figure 1 illustrates the time series pattern of the correlation between bank loan 
intensity and other financial asset intensities for each of the 22 respective source 
countries for 1997, 2001, 2002 and 2003. The correlations for 1998, 1999, and 2000 
could not be computed since after the start of the CPIS data in 1997 the following three 
year’s data before 2001 are missing. As we can see in the figure, the cross correlations 
are positive in almost all cases and above 0.5 in general, which suggests the presence of 
complementarities rather than substitutabilities among the different forms of 
international financial asset holdings.  
Note that the positive correlation between intensities indicates that if a source 
country tends to hold a relatively large amount of bank loans in a specific destination 
country, then the source country also tends to hold a relatively large amount of debts or 
equities in the destination country compared to other destination countries. Note also 
that, for many source countries, correlations among intensities tend to increase over 
time, especially for bank loans and debts, which suggests that the interrelation between 
bank loan integration and debt market integration becomes more intensive as financial 
markets become more integrated. 
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III. Estimation of Complementarities in Cross-border Asset Holdings 
 
1. The Gravity Model of Bilateral Asset Holdings 
 
While the correlation patterns described above imply that financial integrations are 
closely interrelated across different forms of asset holdings, we need to characterize 
further the complementarities within a more elaborated framework of cross-border asset 
holdings. For this purpose, we employ the gravity model as a basic model framework to 
investigate the complementarity among various forms of cross-border asset holdings.  
The gravity model was originally developed as an explanation of the gravitational 
forces in physics and later became popular in economic modeling to explain cross-
border bilateral trade in goods. 8  Following the success of the gravity model in 
explaining bilateral trade patterns in goods, recent attempts have been made to employ 
the gravity model to explain cross-border bilateral financial asset holdings. For instance, 
Martin and Rey (1999) suggest that a gravity equation can be a natural model of 
bilateral asset trade as well since financial assets are not perfect substitutes and cross-
border asset transactions entail some information costs. As discussed above, the related 
literature indicates that the gravity model explains the pattern of bilateral asset holdings 
reasonably well, and based upon this finding we employ the following form of the 
gravity model as a base model to investigate the complementarities among financial 
asset holdings.  
 
                                                 
8 See Frankel (1997) and Evenett and Keller (2002) for theoretical motivations and applications of the 
gravity model in explaining bilateral trade in goods and services. 
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In equation (1) sdAH  is the amount of asset holdings of a source country s in a 
destination country d, and i and t denote the asset type and year, respectively. Pop is the 
size of population and GDP is used to measure the size of the economy.  
It is now standard to add per capita GDP as a measure of the state of economic 
development in addition to the aggregate GDP. Higher per capital GDP is expected to be 
closely associated with deeper financial markets, which may lead to larger cross-border 
financial transactions. Note that this form of gravity model is less restricted than 
standard gravity models for bilateral trade in that it allows the coefficients of GDP and 
GDP per capita to differ across source and destination countries. The application of this 
asymmetric form of gravity model makes more sense in the case of financial asset 
holdings as bilateral asset holdings are not neutral with respect to the direction.  
Other control variables mainly represent information cost. Area is the size of land 
area, and Dist is the shortest distance between countries s and d. Information asymmetry 
may be greater with increasing country land size and distance between the source and 
destination countries. Border, Colony and Language are binary variables that are unity 
if s and d share a land border, have a former colonial relationship, and have a common 
language, respectively. The geographical and cultural proximity may reduce information 
asymmetry and lower information costs. This form of gravity model was also adopted 
by Shin and Yang (2006) in investigating the relationship between financial integration 
and trade integration and found to explain bilateral cross-border asset holdings 
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reasonably well.  
The random effect estimation results for the base gravity model for bilateral 
cross-border asset holdings are reported in Table 2.9 Note that for all types of financial 
asset holdings, the coefficients of GDP and GDP per capita for both source and 
destination countries are significantly positive, which indicates that not only the 
economy size, but also the state of economic development in source and destination 
countries positively affects the volume of cross-border financial asset holdings.  
Note also that the coefficient estimates of information proxy variables are in 
general significant and show the expected signs. For instance, distance is significantly 
negative in all cases, which suggests that information asymmetry may deter financial 
integration for all forms of financial assets. The significant positive coefficients of 
border and common language also confirm this conjecture that information cost is an 
important determinant of cross-border asset holdings. The estimation result indicates 
that the gravity model fits the data reasonably well and hence can be employed as a base 
model to investigate the complementarities among financial asset holdings. 
 
2. Estimation of Complementarities: Augmented Gravity Models 
 
We now turn to the interrelationship among different forms of asset holdings within the 
framework of the gravity model. That is, we investigate whether the complementarities 
among the financial assets observed in Figure 1 still exist when we control the effects of 
gravity factors such as the economy size and the state of development, as well as the 
                                                 
9 We don’t report the fixed effect ‘within’ estimation results. While the fixed effect method can provide 
more consistent estimates by controlling for the effects of omitted country specific factors, we cannot 
obtain coefficient estimates for time-invariant variables such as distance, area and border. Instead, we 
report the ‘between’ effect estimation results in the appendix. 
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proxies to information cost. More specifically we estimate the following augmented 
form of the gravity model for an asset holding of type i in order to investigate its 
relationship with asset holding of type j (i ≠ j):  
 
sditsdsdsdsd
dstddtss
tdtsjtsditsd
LanguageColonyBorderDist
AreaAreaPopGDPPopGDP
GDPGDPAHAH
εββββ
βββ
ββγα
+++++
+++
+++= −
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)ln(
)ln()/ln()/ln(
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To avoid possible inconsistency problems of estimation resulting from the 
simultaneity of asset holdings, we use one-year lagged values for AHj as an explanatory 
variable. The estimation results for bank loans are reported in Table 3. Note that both 
short- and long-term debts and equity holdings have significantly positive coefficient 
estimates in the bank loan regression, which indicates the presence of a strong 
complementarity between bank lending and portfolio asset holdings, even after 
controlling for the effects of gravity factors. The regression result suggests that 
increased financial integrations in portfolio asset holdings tend to reinforce integration 
in bank lending. For example, a one percent increase in bilateral short-term debt 
holdings tends to increase bank loans by 0.328%. In terms of the magnitude of the semi-
elasticity with respect to bank lending, long-term debts have the largest impact (0.534 
percent), followed by equities (0.493 percent), and short-term debts. Note that all the 
gravity factors and information variables are statistically significant and have the 
expected signs, which imply that the complementarities between asset holdings may 
work independently from the gravity channel. 
The augmented gravity models for portfolio assets with a lagged value of bank 
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loans as an explanatory variable are estimated in Table 4. Note that the bank loan 
variable is always positive and statistically significant for all portfolio asset holdings. A 
one percent increase in bank claim tends to increase short-term debt by 0.196%, long-
term debt by 0.371%, and cross-border equity holdings by 0.249%. The results in Table 
4 confirm that international bank lending tends to increase cross-border portfolio asset 
holdings. It is interesting to note that, compared to the results in Table 2, the information 
cost proxy variables now have smaller coefficients in absolute value when we include 
bank lending in the regression. For example, the coefficient of distance is -0.071, -0.290 
and -0.138 in columns (1)-(3), respectively, in Table 4, which can be compared to the 
corresponding figures, -0.123, -0.398 and -0.213, respectively, in Table 2. The 
coefficient estimates for border, colony and common language are also reduced 
significantly in absolute value. This reduced effect of information cost suggests that 
bank lending may influence the degree of information asymmetry and thereby weaken 
the impact of information cost on portfolio asset holdings. 
Note that the presence of strong mutual complementarities among financial asset 
holdings may have resulted from the omission of an important third factor; one such 
candidate is bilateral trade in goods. The cross-border financial asset transaction and 
goods transaction may be positively related with each other because, firstly, the 
geography of information cost may be positively related with the geography of 
transaction cost, and, secondly, a more active bilateral trade relationship may reduce 
information asymmetry and thus facilitate financial integrations between the partner 
countries. Indeed, recent empirical studies such as Kawai and Liu (2001) and Shin and 
Yang (2006) find a significant complementarity between cross-border financial asset 
transactions and goods transactions in their estimation of the gravity models. 
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We re-estimate the complementarities among financial asset holdings by 
including the volume of bilateral trade in goods estimated as exports from source 
country s to destination country d: 
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The regression results for bank lending are summarized in Table 5. The 
significant positive coefficients of the lagged trade variable indicate that trade 
integration enhances financial integration in bank lending. Note that an increase in 
bilateral trade will increase bilateral bank lending for an increasing volume of trade 
credit by banks. The increased volume of bilateral goods transaction may also alleviate 
information asymmetry between trading partners, thereby increasing cross-border bank 
lending.  
More importantly, note that the short- and long-term debts and equity variables 
remain significantly positive even after controlling for this significant bilateral trade 
effect, which implies that the complementarities among asset holdings exist even after 
the influence of increased trade is taken into consideration. Note also that information 
cost proxy variables now become much weaker relative to the results in Table 3, which 
suggests that the previously observed, information cost effect on bank lending at least 
partially reflects the effect of omitted trade variable. However, information cost may 
still be an important determinant of cross-border bank lending as area sizes and colony 
variables remain significant in the regression. 
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Table 6 reports the estimation result for trade augmented gravity models for 
portfolio asset holdings. Note that the lagged bank loans are still significant for all 
portfolio asset holdings after controlling for the bilateral trade effect, which indicates 
that strong complementarities exist with bank lending. Note also that the coefficient 
estimates of the trade variable are all positive and significant. However, the magnitude 
of the elasticity is much smaller for portfolio asset holdings compared with the elasticity 
of international bank lending with respect to trade in Table 5. As for other gravity 
factors, the economy size variable seems to change its sign while per capita GDP 
variables remain significantly positive. 
Next we proceed to test the robustness of the complementarities among asset 
holdings by adding a lagged dependent variable in the regression. This modification is 
essential if asset holdings are serially correlated which has the consequence of an 
omitted lagged dependent variable generating spuriously significant coefficients of 
other lagged explanatory variables of financial asset holdings. In this way, we can infer 
more accurately about the presence of a sequential complementarity among different 
forms of asset holdings:  
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Table 7 reports the regression result on the augmented gravity equation for bank 
loans with a lagged dependent variable. Note that despite the inclusion of the lagged 
bank loan, the coefficients of lagged portfolio asset holdings are significantly positive, 
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which confirms the robustness of the complementarities. It is interesting to observe that 
now the GDP and per capita GDP of the destination countries remain significant while 
those of the source countries lose their explanatory power. Note also that the distance 
variable remains significantly negative. Table 8 shows the regression results for 
portfolio asset holdings and the bank loan variable remains significantly positive after 
controlling for the lagged effect of the dependent variable. 
Finally we add both lagged dependent variable and bilateral trade in goods 
together in the gravity model: 
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As Tables 9 and 10 show, even if we include both bilateral trade and lagged 
dependent variables, financial asset holdings remain strongly complementary among 
themselves. Advances in financial integration in one form of asset holding will lead to 
increased financial integration in other forms of asset holding as well. Note that the 
complementarity between goods trade and asset trade also remains significant in all 
regressions except for the case of long-term debts. 
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IV. Do Banks Have a Special Role?  
 
Our empirical investigations so far have treated bank lending symmetrically with other 
forms of financial asset holdings. In this section, we explore whether the positive 
reinforcing effect from bank lending to portfolio asset holding is somehow associated 
with the special role of banks in alleviating information asymmetry. Note that while the 
estimation results of the augmented gravity models above indicate that the 
complementarities existing between bank lending and portfolio investment are largely 
symmetrical, the factors underlying the complementarities may differ depending upon 
their direction.  
Note however that the volume-based gravity models estimated above may not be 
an adequate model to sort out the special effect of bank lending since both bank lending 
and portfolio asset holding may increase together in volume as the economies develop 
and financial markets deepen, but decrease together as information asymmetry gets 
worsening. To explore the special role of bank lending, it may be necessary to 
investigate directly the structure or composition of the bilateral asset holdings. 
Following the spirit of Buch (2002), using our extended panel dataset, we investigate 
whether the share of bank loans in total bilateral asset holding is significantly associated 
with information variables: 
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AS represents the composition of bilateral asset holdings and we consider three 
ratios for AS: i) bank loans / (bank loans + short-term debts + long-term debts + equity 
holdings), ii) bank loans / (bank loans + short-term debts + long-term debts), and iii) 
short-term debts / (short-term debts + long-term debts). While the third short-term debt 
ratio is not directly related with bank lending, we also investigate this ratio in order to 
explore the role of information cost as a determinant of the maturity structure in external 
bond financing. HC is human capital accumulation, Openness is the degree of openness 
of an economy measured as the ratio of total trading volume of the destination country 
with respect to the world (sum of global exports and global imports) relative to GDP, 
and Law & Order is the degree of development in legal infrastructure. 
Note that the equation (6) is not exactly a gravity model since economy size 
variables are now entirely omitted and HC, Openness, and Law & Order variables are 
included only for destination countries. Economy sizes are not included as explanatory 
variables because it is unlikely that the size matters in determining the composition of 
bilateral asset holdings. On the other hand we include per capita GDP because the state 
of economic development in both source and destination countries may be an important 
factor of external finance structure. Openness is supposed to capture the possible 
association between the degree of openness in goods trade with the external finance 
structure. HC and Law & Order are included to represent the degree of institutional 
quality and infrastructure development in destination countries, which may also be 
important factors in determining the external finance structure. 
Table 11 shows the regression result on the determinants of bilateral asset holding 
structure. Note that per capita GDPs of both source and destination countries as well as 
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human capital accumulation are negatively related with the share of bank loan, which 
indicates that as the economy develops, portfolio assets transactions become more 
important relative to bank loans. This result is also consistent with the information view 
presented above since as countries develop information cost may fall and thus bank 
lending becomes less important (Buch, 2002). The degree of openness of the destination 
country is significantly positively related with the bank loan shares, which suggests that 
countries with a relatively large trading volume relative to GDP tend to receive 
relatively more bank loans. 
Note that the distance variable is positively related with bank loan shares. In the 
case of bank loan share in total external borrowing (bank loans and total debts) the 
coefficient is significantly positive. This implies that bank lending becomes more 
important relative to portfolio investments in external financing with increasing 
information asymmetry between the source and destination countries, given that 
distance proxies well the degree of information asymmetry. This finding supports the 
information view that banks may play a special role even in an international context. 
Contrary to the bank loan shares however, the presence of information cost does not 
seem to influence the maturity structure of external bond financing, as shown in column 
3 of Table 11. 
In sum, the overall results suggest that there may be a special role of banks in 
alleviating information asymmetry and thereby accelerating financial integrations in 
portfolio asset holdings. Then why doesn’t the special effect of bank lending stand out 
distinctly relative to other forms of asset holdings in previous, volume-based, gravity 
models? One possibility is that while the cross-border bank lending tends to increase 
subsequent portfolio asset holdings, this positive effect may be limited by other 
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conditions of destination countries. For instance, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) 
convincingly argue that the legal structure, corporate governance, and other related 
infrastructure are crucial determinants of financial deepening, especially for the 
development of capital markets.  
Indeed, cross-border bank lending may not lead to subsequent capital market 
integrations despite reduced information asymmetry due to bank lending if there is no 
adequate capital market infrastructure such as a legal system to facilitate portfolio 
investments in capital markets. We test for the existence of this potential non-linear 
effect of bank lending by including an interaction term between bank lending and the 
degree of ‘law and order’ - a proxy variable to the development of relevant 
infrastructure:  
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Table 12 reports the regression estimation result for the augmented gravity model 
for bank lending based on equation (7). Note that now the effect of bank lending on 
portfolio asset holding is not constant but a function of the degree in law and order, that 
is, ( dOrderLaw &31 γγ + ). The coefficient of the interaction term is significantly 
positive for all three forms of portfolio asset holdings, which is consistent with our 
conjecture that the degree of this reinforcing effect from bank lending to portfolio asset 
holding is positively influenced by the degree of ‘law and order.’ Namely, the 
acceleration effect of international bank lending is stronger for destination countries 
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with higher degrees of legal infrastructure development. For example, if & dLaw Order  
takes the highest possible value, 6, the impact of a one percent increase in bank loans on 
portfolio equity holdings is 0.344% while the corresponding impact is only 0.014% if it 
takes the lowest value of 0.  
Table 13 reports the estimation of the same model when bank loans are used as a 
dependent variable. Note that, compared to the results in Table 12, the impact of ‘law 
and order’ through its interaction effect is significantly reduced. The coefficient of the 
interaction term between financial asset holdings and ‘law and order’ is not statistically 
significant when the short-term debt is an independent variable. For long-term debts and 
equities, although the coefficient estimates are significant, the size is as low as a half of 
those presented in Table 12. These results imply that the reinforcing effects of other 
portfolio assets on bank loans may not necessarily be stronger for destination countries 
with higher degrees of legal infrastructure development. 10 
 
                                                 
10 In appendix tables 12 and 13, we report between-effect estimation results. These results are even more 
strikingly contrasted: the estimates of the interaction term between bank loans and ‘law and order’ are 
positive and statistically significant in Table 12-A, while the interaction terms between other portfolio 
assets and ‘law and order’ are sometimes negative and statistically significant in Table 13-A. 
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V. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper we study the dynamics of international financial integration utilizing a 
recently available dataset of cross-border financial asset holdings. We investigate 
whether different forms of cross-border capital flows are mutually reinforcing, and if 
they are, whether the complementarities are symmetric across bank lending and 
portfolio investments. In investigating the pattern and structure of the cross-border 
bilateral asset holdings, we also pay attention to the special role of banks in accelerating 
other forms of financial integration by alleviating information asymmetry. 
By employing a variant of the gravity model, we find strong evidence for the 
presence of complementarities among bank loans, short- and long-term debts, and 
portfolio equity holdings. The complementarities can be explained by common factors 
of standard gravity models such as economy size, state of development, and information 
cost proxies. However, we also find the presence of a direct channel of 
complementarities among financial asset holdings that cannot be explained by these 
gravity factors. These complementarities remain significant even after controlling for 
the effects of bilateral trade in goods as well as lagged dependent variable. 
We proceed to investigate whether the complementarities can be characterized by 
the models that predict a special role of banks. We find supporting evidence for this 
hypothesis in that international bank lending tends to increase the volume of portfolio 
asset holdings. By investigating the determinants of the structure of bilateral asset 
holdings, we also find positive evidence for the information role of banks. The share of 
bank lending decreases with increasing state of development of destination countries 
measured by per capita GDP and human capital accumulation, but increases with 
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increasing distance, suggesting that information cost may play an important role in 
determining the structure of cross-border asset holdings. Furthermore, this effect of 
bank lending in accelerating financial integration of other forms of asset holdings is 
stronger for destination countries with higher degrees of ‘law and order.’ This finding 
suggests that cross-border bank lending may not lead to capital market integration, 
despite reduced information cost due to international bank lending, if there is no 
appropriate infrastructure to facilitate portfolio investments. 
Our findings suggest a number of interesting future research issues, one of which 
is the further illumination of channels underlying the strong complementarities among 
asset holdings. While the reduction in information cost may be one such channel 
through which international bank lending may lead to increased cross-border portfolio 
investments, other channels are largely unknown, especially for the effect of portfolio 
investments on bank lending. Another issue requiring further investigation is the role of 
international bank lending in facilitating other forms of external financing. Note that in 
this paper we have investigated the quantity impact only. However, the increased 
volume of cross-border bank lending may improve the terms and conditions of other 
external financing as well. That is, it may reduce the funding cost of destination 
countries by lowering interest rates or improving maturity structure in bond financing.  
 
 25
References 
Barro, R. J. and Lee, J. W. (2001), “International Data on Educational Attainment: 
Updates and Implications,” Oxford Economics Papers, Vol. 53, 541-563. 
Buch, C. M. (2002), “Are Banks Different? Evidence from International Data,” 
International Finance, Vol. 5, No. 1, 97-114. 
Diamond, D. (1984), “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring,” Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 51, 393-414. 
Diamond, D. (1991), “Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and 
Privately Placed Debt,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99, 689-721. 
Evenett, S. J. and Keller, W (2002), "On Theories Explaining the Success of the Gravity 
Equation," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 110, No. 2, 281-316.  
Frankel, J. (1997), Regional Trading Blocs, Institute for International Economics: 
Washington DC. 
Ghosh, S. and Wolf, H. (1999), “The Geography of Capital Flows,” in S. Edwards, ed., 
Capital Inflows to Emerging Markets, University of Chicago Press.  
Hahm, J. H. and Kang, J. K. (2005), “SME Financing and Bank Lending: A Study on 
the Innovative SMEs,” Quarterly Economic Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 87-119, 
Bank of Korea. 
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A., and Scharfstein, D. (1993), “The Choice between Public and 
Private Debt: An Analysis of Post-deregulation Corporate Financing in Japan,” 
NBER working paper no. 4421. 
Hull, L. and Tesar, L. (2001), “The Structure of International Capital Flows,” in H. 
Siebert (ed.) The World’s New Financial Landscape: Challenges for Economic 
Policy, Michigan: Michigan University Press, 87-109. 
 26
James, C. (1987), “Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 19, 217-235. 
Kawai, M. and Liu, L. G. (2001), “Determinants of International Commercial Bank 
Loans to Developing Countries,” mimeo, Asian Development Bank Institute. 
Kim, S., Lee, J. W. and Shin, K. (2005), “Regional and Global Financial Integration in 
East Asia,” mimeo, Korea University. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1997), “Legal 
Determinants of External Finance,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, 1131-1150.  
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1998), “Law and 
Finance,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, 1113-1155. 
Lane, P. R. and Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2001), “External Capital Structure: Theory and 
Evidence,” in H. Siebert ed. The World’s New Financial Landscape: Challenges 
for Economic Policy, Michigan University Press, 247-84. 
Lummer, S. L. and McConnell, J. (1989), “Further Evidence on the Bank Lending 
Process and the Capital Market Response to Bank Loan Agreements,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 25, 99-122. 
Martin, P. and Rey, H. (1999), “Financial Supermarkets: Size Matters for Asset Trade,” 
CEPR DP 2232. 
Portes, R. and Rey, H. (2000), “The Determinants of Cross-border Equity Flows: The 
Geography of Information,” Center for International and Development Economics 
Research working paper, UC Berkeley. 
Rose, A. and Spiegel, M. (2004), “A Gravity Model of International Lending: Trade, 
Default and Credit,” IMF Staff Papers 51, 50-63.  
Shin, K. and Yang, D. Y. (2006), “Trade and Financial Integration: Do They Reinforce 
 27
Each Other?, a paper presented at the KIEP and SNU seminar, China and 
Emerging Asia: Reorganizing the Global Economy, May 11-12, 2006. 
Stiglitz, J. and A. Weiss (1983), “Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to 
Credit and Labor Markets,” American Economic Review, Vol. 73, 912-927. 
Tesar, L. and Werner, I. (1995), “Home Bias and High Turnover,” Journal of 
International Money and Finance, Vol. 14, 467-492. 
 28
 
<Figure 1> Correlation between Bank Loan Intensity and Other Financial Assets 
Intensity 
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Note: The figure shows the time series pattern of correlations between bank loan intensity and other 
financial assets intensity for 22 respective source countries for 1997, 2001, 2002 and 2003. Three 
correlations are reported: correlations between bank loan intensity and short-term debt intensity 
(corr_loan_std), between bank loan intensity and long-term debt intensity (corr_loan_ltd) and between 
bank loan intensity and equity intensity (corr_loan_eq). 
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<Table 1> Summary Statistics 
 
Observations (N=5,940) 
Variables  
Mean Std. Dev 
Log Trade 1.35 1.47 
Log Bank Loan 1.4 1.8 
Log Short-term Debt 0.24 0.76 
Log Long-term Debt 0.88 1.58 
Log Equity 0.73 1.47 
Log GDP of Source Country 8.69 1.21 
Log GDP of Destination Country 5.66 2.26 
Log Per Capita GDP of Source Country 5.44 0.44 
Log Per Capita GDP of Destination Country 3.36 1.66 
Log Product of Area Sizes 24.40 2.72 
Log Distance 7.99 0.87 
Border 0.03 0.17 
Colony 0.05 0.21 
Common Language 0.14 0.34 
Human Capital 5.49 2.94 
Law and Order 3.73 1.57 
 
Note: The summary statistics are based upon the bilateral variables for the cross-border portfolio holdings 
and bank claims data. See data descriptions in the text for variable definitions and sources. 
 
 30
 
<Table 2> The Gravity Model for Financial Asset Holdings: Base Models 
(Random Effects Estimation) 
 
 Bank Loans 
Short-term 
Debts 
Long-term 
Debts 
Equities 
GDP of Source Country 
0.442*** 
[0.019] 
0.077*** 
[0.010] 
0.241*** 
[0.018] 
0.190*** 
[0.018] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
0.414*** 
[0.015] 
0.080*** 
[0.008] 
0.250*** 
[0.014] 
0.230*** 
[0.014] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.373*** 
[0.040] 
0.163*** 
[0.023] 
0.431*** 
[0.038] 
0.355*** 
[0.037] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.129*** 
[0.019] 
0.068*** 
[0.010] 
0.169*** 
[0.018] 
0.148*** 
[0.017] 
Product of Area Sizes 
-0.061*** 
[0.010] 
0.004 
[0.006] 
0.005 
[0.010] 
0.006 
[0.010] 
Distance 
-0.334*** 
[0.028] 
-0.123*** 
[0.015] 
-0.398*** 
[0.027] 
-0.213*** 
[0.026] 
Border 
1.289*** 
[0.143] 
0.642*** 
[0.077] 
1.068*** 
[0.137] 
1.266*** 
[0.135] 
Colony 
0.712*** 
[0.108] 
0.124** 
[0.058] 
0.079 
[0.103] 
0.079 
[0.101] 
Common Language 
0.295*** 
[0.060] 
0.109*** 
[0.033] 
0.172*** 
[0.057] 
0.346*** 
[0.056] 
Observations 
R-Squared 
5,940 
0.65 
5,940 
0.30 
5,940 
0.57 
5,940 
0.52 
 
Note: All the variables are on the bilateral basis between source country and destination country. The 
dependent variables are outstanding amounts of bank loans, short-term debts, long-term debts and equities 
held by a source country in a destination country. Natural logarithms were taken after adding one to 
include all the observations with zero value. Natural logarithms were also taken for the explanatory 
variables except dummy variables. Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in the 
parentheses. Intercept and year dummy variables were included but not reported to save space. ***, ** 
and * indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 %, 5% and 10 % level, 
respectively. The same results are also reported in Table 5 of Shin and Yang (2006).  
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<Table 3> The Gravity Model for Bank Loans: Impact of Portfolio Assets 
(Random Effects Estimation) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Short-term Debts 
(lagged) 
0.328*** 
[0.018] 
  
Long-term Debts 
(lagged) 
 
0.534*** 
[0.013] 
 
Equities 
(lagged) 
  
0.493*** 
[0.014] 
GDP of Source Country 
0.408*** 
[0.018] 
0.304*** 
[0.016] 
0.339*** 
[0.016] 
GDP of Destination Country 
0.404*** 
[0.015] 
0.294*** 
[0.013] 
0.314*** 
[0.013] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.311*** 
[0.040] 
0.113*** 
[0.035] 
0.134*** 
[0.037] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.110*** 
[0.018] 
0.034** 
[0.016] 
0.045*** 
[0.016] 
Product of 
Area Sizes 
-0.059*** 
[0.010] 
-0.062*** 
[0.009] 
-0.062*** 
[0.009] 
Distance 
-0.337*** 
[0.027] 
-0.176*** 
[0.023] 
-0.288*** 
[0.024] 
Border 
1.024*** 
[0.137] 
0.656*** 
[0.117] 
0.601*** 
[0.122] 
Colony 
0.719*** 
[0.104] 
0.717*** 
[0.089] 
0.713*** 
[0.093] 
Common Language 
0.283*** 
[0.058] 
0.219*** 
[0.050] 
0.135*** 
[0.052] 
Observations 5,814 5,814 5,814 
R-Squared 0.70 0.77 0.76 
 
Note: The dependent variable is bank loans. For other information see notes in Table 2. 
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<Table 4> The Gravity Model for Portfolio Assets: Impact of Bank Loans 
(Random Effects Estimation) 
 
 Short-term Debts Long-term Debts Equities 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
0.196*** 
[0.008] 
0.371*** 
[0.011] 
0.249*** 
[0.010] 
GDP of Source Country 
-0.002 
[0.010] 
0.088*** 
[0.015] 
0.085*** 
[0.016] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
-0.001 
[0.008] 
0.106*** 
[0.013] 
0.137*** 
[0.013] 
Per capita GDP of 
Source country 
0.089*** 
[0.023] 
0.328*** 
[0.034] 
0.320*** 
[0.034] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.046*** 
[0.010] 
0.145*** 
[0.015] 
0.138*** 
[0.015] 
Product of 
Area Sizes 
0.015*** 
[0.005] 
0.027*** 
[0.008] 
0.021** 
[0.008] 
Distance 
-0.071*** 
[0.014] 
-0.290*** 
[0.022] 
-0.138*** 
[0.023] 
Border 
0.369*** 
[0.071] 
0.579*** 
[0.112] 
0.911*** 
[0.116] 
Colony 
0.001 
[0.053] 
-0.150* 
[0.084] 
-0.059 
[0.087] 
Common Language 
0.044 
[0.031] 
0.063 
[0.047] 
0.269*** 
[0.049] 
Observations 5,880 5,880 5,880 
R-Squared 0.41 0.71 0.68 
Note: The dependent variables are other financial asset holdings such as short-term debts (column 1), 
long term debts (column 2) and equities (column 3). The lagged bank loan is added as an explanatory 
variable. For other information see note in Table 2. 
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<Table 5> The Gravity Model for Bank Loans: Impact of Trade and Portfolio Assets 
(Random Effects Estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Trade 
(lagged) 
0.788*** 
[0.020] 
0.612*** 
[0.020] 
0.665*** 
[0.020] 
Short-term Debts 
(lagged) 
0.248*** 
[0.017] 
  
Long-term Debts 
(lagged) 
 
0.384*** 
[0.013] 
 
Equities 
(lagged) 
  
0.335*** 
[0.014] 
GDP of Source Country 
0.066*** 
[0.017] 
0.070*** 
[0.016] 
0.076*** 
[0.016] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
0.067*** 
[0.015] 
0.064*** 
[0.014] 
0.061*** 
[0.014] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.322*** 
[0.033] 
0.176*** 
[0.032] 
0.199*** 
[0.032] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.114*** 
[0.015] 
0.058*** 
[0.014] 
0.070*** 
[0.014] 
Product of Area Sizes 
-0.020** 
[0.008] 
-0.031*** 
[0.008] 
-0.029*** 
[0.008] 
Distance 
-0.028 
[0.023] 
0.014 
[0.021] 
-0.049** 
[0.022] 
Border 
0.144 
[0.113] 
0.097 
[0.104] 
0.02 
[0.107] 
Colony 
0.569*** 
[0.085] 
0.605*** 
[0.078] 
0.594*** 
[0.080] 
Common language 
 
0.075 
[0.048] 
0.077* 
[0.044] 
0.009 
[0.045] 
Observations 5,814 5,814 5,814 
R-Squared 0.79 0.81 0.81 
Note: The dependent variable is bank loans. The lagged bilateral trade (exports + imports) is added as an 
explanatory variable. For other information see note in Table 2.
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<Table 6> The Gravity Model for Portfolio Assets: Impact of Trade and Bank Loans 
(Random Effects Estimation) 
 
 Short-term Debts Long-term Debts Equities 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
0.157*** 
[0.010] 
0.300*** 
[0.012] 
0.191*** 
[0.011] 
Trade 
(lagged) 
0.141*** 
[0.016] 
0.364*** 
[0.020] 
0.356*** 
[0.020] 
GDP of Source Country 
-0.045*** 
[0.011] 
-0.034** 
[0.016] 
-0.038** 
[0.016] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
-0.048*** 
[0.010] 
-0.024* 
[0.014] 
0.008 
[0.014] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.103*** 
[0.023] 
0.357*** 
[0.033] 
0.352*** 
[0.033] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.048*** 
[0.009] 
0.152*** 
[0.014] 
0.146*** 
[0.015] 
Product of Area Sizes 
0.020*** 
[0.005] 
0.041*** 
[0.008] 
0.035*** 
[0.008] 
Distance 
-0.024 
[0.015] 
-0.158*** 
[0.023] 
-0.004 
[0.023] 
Border 
0.264*** 
[0.072] 
0.261** 
[0.109] 
0.585*** 
[0.113] 
Colony 
-0.005 
[0.053] 
-0.188** 
[0.081] 
-0.104 
[0.084] 
Common Language 
0.018 
[0.030] 
-0.012 
[0.046] 
0.194*** 
[0.047] 
Observations 5,753 5,753 5,753 
R-Squared 0.42 0.73 0.67 
Note: The dependent variables are other financial asset holdings such as short-term debts (column 1), 
long term debts (column 2) and equities (column 3). The lagged bilateral trade (exports + imports) is 
added as an explanatory variable. For other information see note in Table 2. 
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<Table 7> The Gravity Model for Bank Loans: Impact of Lagged Loans and 
Portfolio Assets (Random Effects Estimation) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Short-term Debts  
(lagged) 
0.034*** 
[0.006] 
  
Long-term Debts  
(lagged) 
 
0.031*** 
[0.004] 
 
Equities 
(lagged) 
  
0.026*** 
[0.004] 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
0.978*** 
[0.004] 
0.969*** 
[0.004] 
0.973*** 
[0.004] 
GDP of Source Country 
-0.002 
[0.004] 
-0.003 
[0.004] 
-0.002 
[0.004] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
0.014*** 
[0.003] 
0.012*** 
[0.003] 
0.012*** 
[0.003] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.021** 
[0.010] 
0.011 
[0.010] 
0.012 
[0.010] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.016*** 
[0.004] 
0.012*** 
[0.004] 
0.014*** 
[0.004] 
Product of Area Sizes 
0.002 
[0.002] 
0 
[0.002] 
0.001 
[0.002] 
Distance 
-0.066*** 
[0.005] 
-0.061*** 
[0.005] 
-0.067*** 
[0.005] 
Border 
-0.060** 
[0.025] 
-0.058** 
[0.025] 
-0.063** 
[0.025] 
Colony 
0.054*** 
[0.020] 
0.061*** 
[0.020] 
0.060*** 
[0.020] 
Common Language 
-0.004 
[0.012] 
-0.003 
[0.012] 
-0.011 
[0.012] 
Observations 5,627 5,627 5,627 
R-Squared 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Note: The dependent variable is bank loans. The lagged dependent variable is added as an explanatory 
variable. For other information see note in Table 2. 
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<Table 8> The Gravity Model for Portfolio Assets: Impact of Lagged Portfolio Assets 
and Bank Loans (Random Effects Estimation) 
 Short-term Debts Long-term Debts Equities 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
0.041*** 
[0.008] 
0.017*** 
[0.006] 
0.024*** 
[0.007] 
Short-term Debts  
(lagged) 
0.891*** 
[0.012] 
  
Long-term Debts  
(lagged) 
 
0.997*** 
[0.006] 
 
Equities 
(lagged) 
  
0.965*** 
[0.007] 
GDP of Source Country 
-0.029*** 
[0.010] 
-0.025*** 
[0.007] 
-0.007 
[0.007] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
-0.01 
[0.008] 
-0.010* 
[0.006] 
0.010* 
[0.006] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.099*** 
[0.023] 
0.032** 
[0.016] 
0.075*** 
[0.017] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.034*** 
[0.008] 
0.037*** 
[0.006] 
0.018*** 
[0.006] 
Product of Area Sizes 
0.016*** 
[0.005] 
0.015*** 
[0.003] 
0.004 
[0.003] 
Distance 
-0.036*** 
[0.011] 
-0.061*** 
[0.008] 
0 
[0.008] 
Border 
-0.023 
[0.049] 
-0.018 
[0.035] 
0.065* 
[0.037] 
Colony 
0.008 
[0.044] 
-0.028 
[0.032] 
-0.035 
[0.033] 
Common Language 
0.026 
[0.030] 
-0.026 
[0.021] 
0.019 
[0.022] 
Observations 2,416 2,416 2,416 
R-Squared 0.84 0.98 0.97 
Note: The dependent variables are other financial asset holdings such as short-term debts (column 1), 
long term debts (column 2) and equities (column 3). The lagged dependent variable is added as an 
explanatory variable. For other information see note in Table 2. 
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<Table 9> The Gravity Model for Bank Loans: Impact of Trade, Lagged Loans and 
Portfolio Assets (Random Effects Estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Trade 
(lagged) 
0.050*** 
[0.006] 
0.045*** 
[0.007] 
0.047*** 
[0.007] 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
0.961*** 
[0.004] 
0.956*** 
[0.005] 
0.959*** 
[0.005] 
Short-term Debts  
(lagged) 
0.029*** 
[0.006] 
  
Long-term Debts  
(lagged) 
 
0.024*** 
[0.004] 
 
Equities 
(lagged) 
  
0.020*** 
[0.004] 
GDP of Source Country 
-0.017*** 
[0.005] 
-0.017*** 
[0.005] 
-0.017*** 
[0.005] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
-0.002 
[0.004] 
-0.002 
[0.004] 
-0.003 
[0.004] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.027*** 
[0.010] 
0.019* 
[0.010] 
0.020** 
[0.010] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.019*** 
[0.004] 
0.016*** 
[0.004] 
0.017*** 
[0.004] 
Product of Area Sizes 
0.003 
[0.002] 
0.002 
[0.002] 
0.003 
[0.002] 
Distance 
-0.050*** 
[0.006] 
-0.048*** 
[0.006] 
-0.052*** 
[0.006] 
Border 
-0.088*** 
[0.025] 
-0.084*** 
[0.025] 
-0.089*** 
[0.025] 
Colony 
0.059*** 
[0.020] 
0.064*** 
[0.020] 
0.063*** 
[0.020] 
Common Language 
-0.014 
[0.012] 
-0.012 
[0.012] 
-0.018 
[0.012] 
Observations 5,627 5,627 5,627 
R-Squared 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Note: The dependent variable is bank loans. The lagged dependent variable and bilateral trade (exports + 
imports) are added as explanatory variables. For other information see note in Table 2. 
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<Table10> The Gravity Model for Portfolio Assets: Impact of Trade, Lagged Portfolio 
Assets and Bank Loans (Random Effects Estimation) 
 Short-term Debts Long-term Debts Equities 
Trade 
(lagged) 
0.039*** 
[0.014] 
-0.001 
[0.011] 
0.029*** 
[0.011] 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
0.029*** 
[0.009] 
0.017** 
[0.007] 
0.016** 
[0.007] 
Short-term Debts  
(lagged) 
0.886*** 
[0.012] 
  
Long-term Debts  
(lagged) 
 
0.998*** 
[0.007] 
 
Equities 
(lagged) 
  
0.961*** 
[0.007] 
GDP of Source Country 
-0.042*** 
[0.011] 
-0.024*** 
[0.008] 
-0.016** 
[0.008] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
-0.024** 
[0.009] 
-0.009 
[0.007] 
-0.001 
[0.007] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.101*** 
[0.023] 
0.032* 
[0.016] 
0.079*** 
[0.017] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.037*** 
[0.008] 
0.037*** 
[0.006] 
0.021*** 
[0.006] 
Product of Area Sizes 
0.018*** 
[0.005] 
0.015*** 
[0.003] 
0.005 
[0.003] 
Distance 
-0.022* 
[0.012] 
-0.061*** 
[0.009] 
0.01 
[0.009] 
Border 
-0.043 
[0.049] 
-0.018 
[0.035] 
0.051 
[0.037] 
Colony 
0.008 
[0.044] 
-0.028 
[0.032] 
-0.036 
[0.033] 
Common Language 
0.019 
[0.030] 
-0.026 
[0.021] 
0.016 
[0.022] 
Observations 2,416 2,416 2,416 
R-Squared 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Note: The dependent variables are other financial asset holdings such as short-term debts (column 1), 
long term debts (column 2) and equities (column 3). The lagged dependent variable and bilateral trade 
(exports + imports) are added as explanatory variables. For other information see note in Table 2. 
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<Table 11> Determinants of Cross-Border Financial Asset Holding Composition 
(Random Effects Estimation) 
 
Bank Loans / 
(Loans + Total Portfolios)
Bank Loans / 
(Loans + Total Debts) 
ST Debts / 
Total Debts 
GDP per capita of 
Source Country 
-4.497** 
[1.551] 
-0.03 
[1.532] 
-7.375** 
[1.003] 
GDP per capita of 
Destination Country 
-4.720** 
[1.000] 
-3.280** 
[0.978] 
-0.353 
[0.673] 
Human Capital 
-15.312* 
[5.991] 
-12.089* 
[5.906] 
-6.854 
[3.855] 
Openness 
4.835** 
[1.566] 
6.809** 
[1.537] 
-2.132* 
[1.018] 
Distance 
0.594 
[0.904] 
2.698** 
[0.897] 
-0.018 
[0.562] 
Common Language 
-2.007 
[2.432] 
4.599 
[2.414] 
5.436** 
[1.517] 
Law and Order 
0.224 
[0.569] 
0.557 
[0.544] 
1.591** 
[0.454] 
Observations 
R-Squared 
2,125 
0.15 
2,125 
0.12 
2,125 
0.07 
Note: The dependent variables in columns 1-3 are the composition shares of bilateral asset holdings 
defined as i) bank loans / (bank loans + short-term debts + long-term debts + equity holdings), ii) bank 
loans / (bank loans + short-term debts + long-term debts), and iii) short-term debts / (short-term debts + 
long-term debts), respectively. For other information see note in Table 2. 
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<Table 12> The Gravity Model for Portfolio Assets: Impact of Bank Loans and ‘Law 
and Order’ (Random Effects Estimation) 
 Short-term Debts Long-term Debts Equities 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
-0.070*** 
[0.021] 
0.207*** 
[0.025] 
0.014 
[0.024] 
Law and Order 
-0.065*** 
[0.011] 
-0.061*** 
[0.014] 
-0.049*** 
[0.013] 
Law and Order * Loans 
0.058*** 
[0.004] 
0.034*** 
[0.005] 
0.055*** 
[0.005] 
GDP of Source Country 
0.003 
[0.012] 
0.105*** 
[0.018] 
0.105*** 
[0.018] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
0.020* 
[0.010] 
0.142*** 
[0.016] 
0.171*** 
[0.016] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.107*** 
[0.025] 
0.376*** 
[0.037] 
0.332*** 
[0.037] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.041*** 
[0.012] 
0.163*** 
[0.018] 
0.140*** 
[0.018] 
Product of Area Sizes 
0.024*** 
[0.006] 
0.044*** 
[0.010] 
0.032*** 
[0.010] 
Distance 
-0.069*** 
[0.017] 
-0.335*** 
[0.027] 
-0.136*** 
[0.027] 
Border 
0.278*** 
[0.076] 
0.441*** 
[0.123] 
0.743*** 
[0.124] 
Colony 
0.068 
[0.063] 
-0.113 
[0.102] 
-0.01 
[0.103] 
Common Language 
0.035 
[0.036] 
0.046 
[0.058] 
0.298*** 
[0.058] 
Observations 4,785 4,785 4,785 
R-squared 0.52 0.74 0.72 
Note: The dependent variables are other financial asset holdings such as short-term debts (column 1), 
long term debts (column 2) and equities (column 3). ‘Law and order’ and its interaction term with bank 
loans are added as explanatory variables. For other information see note in Table 2. 
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<Table 13> The Gravity Model for Bank Loans: Impact of Portfolio Assets and ‘Law 
and Order’ (Random Effects Estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Short-term Debts 
(lagged) 
0.271*** 
[0.087]   
Law and Order 
*Short-term Debts 
0.006 
[0.017]   
Long-term Debts 
(lagged)  
0.405*** 
[0.037]  
Law and Order 
*Long-term Debts  
0.020*** 
[0.007]  
Equities 
(lagged)   
0.356*** 
[0.047] 
Law and Order 
*Equities   
0.020** 
[0.009] 
Law and Order 0.001 [0.013] 
-0.018 
[0.014] 
-0.033** 
[0.014] 
GDP of Source Country 0.468*** [0.021] 
0.358*** 
[0.019] 
0.398*** 
[0.019] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
0.460*** 
[0.018] 
0.340*** 
[0.016] 
0.369*** 
[0.017] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.306*** 
[0.045] 
0.106*** 
[0.040] 
0.125*** 
[0.041] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.105*** 
[0.022] 
0.028 
[0.020] 
0.042** 
[0.020] 
Product of Area Sizes -0.063*** [0.012] 
-0.070*** 
[0.010] 
-0.069*** 
[0.011] 
Distance -0.374*** [0.031] 
-0.207*** 
[0.027] 
-0.335*** 
[0.028] 
Border 0.862*** [0.146] 
0.565*** 
[0.127] 
0.492*** 
[0.132] 
Colony 0.878*** [0.125] 
0.862*** 
[0.108] 
0.859*** 
[0.112] 
Common Language 0.332*** [0.070] 
0.263*** 
[0.061] 
0.163** 
[0.063] 
Observations 4,943 4,943 4,943 
R-Squared 0.70 0.77 0.75 
Note: The dependent variable is bank loans. ‘Law and order’ and its interaction term with other financial 
asset holdings such as short-term debts (column 1), long term debts (column 2) and equities (column 3) 
are added as explanatory variables. For other information see note in Table 2. 
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APPENDIX : Between Effects Estimation Results 
 
<Table 2-A> The Gravity Model for Financial Asset Holdings: Base Models 
(Between Effects Estimation) 
 
 Bank Loans 
Short-term 
Debts 
Long-term 
Debts 
Equities 
GDP of Source Country 
0.380*** 
[0.020] 
0.059*** 
[0.011] 
0.180*** 
[0.019] 
0.149*** 
[0.019] 
GDP of Partner Country 
0.373*** 
[0.016] 
0.069*** 
[0.009] 
0.219*** 
[0.015] 
0.205*** 
[0.015] 
Per capita GDP of 
Source Country 
0.540*** 
[0.047] 
0.174*** 
[0.026] 
0.631*** 
[0.045] 
0.623*** 
[0.044] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.157*** 
[0.019] 
0.071*** 
[0.010] 
0.226*** 
[0.018] 
0.207*** 
[0.018] 
Product of Area Sizes 
-0.035*** 
[0.011] 
0.010* 
[0.006] 
0.032*** 
[0.010] 
0.028*** 
[0.010] 
Distance 
-0.282*** 
[0.028] 
-0.116*** 
[0.015] 
-0.348*** 
[0.027] 
-0.155*** 
[0.026] 
Border 
1.273*** 
[0.142] 
0.631*** 
[0.078] 
1.045*** 
[0.135] 
1.273*** 
[0.133] 
Colony 
0.721*** 
[0.107] 
0.128** 
[0.058] 
0.109 
[0.101] 
0.097 
[0.100] 
Common Language 
0.308*** 
[0.059] 
0.100*** 
[0.032] 
0.181*** 
[0.057] 
0.361*** 
[0.055] 
Observations 
R-Squared 
5,940 
0.65 
5,940 
0.31 
5,940 
0.57 
5,940 
0.51 
Note: This is the same table as Table 2 except that between-effect estimation results are reported. For 
other information see note in Table 2. 
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<Table 3-A> The Gravity Model for Bank Loans: Impact of Portfolio Assets 
(Between Effects Estimation) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Short-term Debts 
(lagged) 
0.887*** 
[0.033] 
  
Long-term Debts 
(lagged) 
 
0.693*** 
[0.016] 
 
Equities 
(lagged) 
  
0.672*** 
[0.017] 
GDP of Source 
Country 
0.323*** 
[0.019] 
0.247*** 
[0.017] 
0.275*** 
[0.017] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
0.323*** 
[0.015] 
0.231*** 
[0.013] 
0.245*** 
[0.014] 
Per capita GDP of 
Source Country 
0.430*** 
[0.044] 
0.129*** 
[0.039] 
0.148*** 
[0.041] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.095*** 
[0.018] 
0.006 
[0.016] 
0.022 
[0.016] 
Product of 
Area Sizes 
-0.043*** 
[0.010] 
-0.054*** 
[0.009] 
-0.052*** 
[0.009] 
Distance 
-0.211*** 
[0.026] 
-0.087*** 
[0.023] 
-0.220*** 
[0.023] 
Border 
0.683*** 
[0.132] 
0.504*** 
[0.114] 
0.381*** 
[0.119] 
Colony 
0.627*** 
[0.099] 
0.687*** 
[0.086] 
0.682*** 
[0.089] 
Common Language 
0.233*** 
[0.055] 
0.190*** 
[0.048] 
0.07 
[0.050] 
Observations 5,814 5,814 5,814 
R-Squared 0.73 0.79 0.78 
Note: This is the same table as Table 3 except that between-effect estimation results are reported. For 
other information see note in Table 3.  
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<Table 4-A> The Gravity Model for Portfolio Assets: Impact of Bank Loans 
(Between Effects Estimation) 
 
 Short-term Debts Long-term Debts Equities 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
0.261*** 
[0.010] 
0.618*** 
[0.015] 
0.590*** 
[0.015] 
GDP of Source Country 
-0.026** 
[0.010] 
-0.033** 
[0.016] 
-0.058*** 
[0.016] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
-0.027*** 
[0.009] 
-0.009 
[0.013] 
-0.01 
[0.013] 
Per capita GDP of 
Source Country 
0.033 
[0.028] 
0.318*** 
[0.042] 
0.314*** 
[0.043] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.034*** 
[0.010] 
0.135*** 
[0.014] 
0.122*** 
[0.014] 
Product of 
Area Sizes 
0.017*** 
[0.005] 
0.050*** 
[0.008] 
0.045*** 
[0.008] 
Distance 
-0.054*** 
[0.014] 
-0.203*** 
[0.022] 
-0.017 
[0.022] 
Border 
0.263*** 
[0.071] 
0.246** 
[0.108] 
0.471*** 
[0.108] 
Colony 
-0.051 
[0.053] 
-0.319*** 
[0.080] 
-0.305*** 
[0.080] 
Common Language 
0.019 
[0.029] 
-0.011 
[0.044] 
0.175*** 
[0.045] 
Observations 5,880 5,880 5,880 
R-Squared 0.46 0.75 0.70 
Note: This is the same table as Table 4 except that between-effect estimation results are reported. For 
other information see note in Table 4. 
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<Table 5-A> The Gravity Model for Bank Loans: Impact of Trade and Portfolio Assets 
(Between Effects Estimation) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Trade 
(lagged) 
0.788*** 
[0.023] 
0.605*** 
[0.024] 
0.648*** 
[0.024] 
Short-term Debts 
(lagged) 
0.523*** 
[0.029] 
  
Long-term Debts 
(lagged) 
 
0.463*** 
[0.017] 
 
Equities 
(lagged) 
  
0.435*** 
[0.018] 
GDP of Source Country 
0.019 
[0.018] 
0.039** 
[0.017] 
0.042** 
[0.017] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
0.013 
[0.015] 
0.024* 
[0.014] 
0.018 
[0.015] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.427*** 
[0.036] 
0.230*** 
[0.035] 
0.247*** 
[0.036] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.099*** 
[0.015] 
0.040*** 
[0.014] 
0.052*** 
[0.014] 
Product of Area Sizes 
-0.008 
[0.008] 
-0.023*** 
[0.008] 
-0.020** 
[0.008] 
Distance 
0.049** 
[0.023] 
0.070*** 
[0.021] 
-0.004 
[0.022] 
Border 
-0.015 
[0.111] 
0.037 
[0.104] 
-0.077 
[0.106] 
Colony 
0.499*** 
[0.082] 
0.571*** 
[0.077] 
0.559*** 
[0.078] 
Common Language 
0.062 
[0.046] 
0.075* 
[0.043] 
-0.011 
[0.044] 
Observations 5,814 5,814 5,814 
R-squared 0.81 0.84 0.83 
Note: This is the same table as Table 5 except that between-effect estimation results are reported. For 
other information see note in Table 5. 
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<Table 6-A> The Gravity Model for Portfolio Assets: Impact of Trade and Bank Loans 
(Between Effects Estimation) 
 
 Short-term Debts Long-term Debts Equities 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
0.208*** 
[0.013] 
0.480*** 
[0.019] 
0.474*** 
[0.020] 
Trade 
(lagged) 
0.120*** 
[0.019] 
0.313*** 
[0.028] 
0.262*** 
[0.028] 
GDP of Source Country 
-0.052*** 
[0.011] 
-0.101*** 
[0.017] 
-0.115*** 
[0.017] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
-0.056*** 
[0.010] 
-0.086*** 
[0.015] 
-0.074*** 
[0.015] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.046 
[0.028] 
0.346*** 
[0.041] 
0.338*** 
[0.042] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.037*** 
[0.009] 
0.144*** 
[0.014] 
0.128*** 
[0.014] 
Product of Area Sizes 
0.019*** 
[0.005] 
0.057*** 
[0.008] 
0.050*** 
[0.008] 
Distance 
-0.021 
[0.015] 
-0.115*** 
[0.023] 
0.059** 
[0.023] 
Border 
0.204*** 
[0.072] 
0.087 
[0.107] 
0.341*** 
[0.108] 
Colony 
-0.044 
[0.053] 
-0.302*** 
[0.078] 
-0.290*** 
[0.079] 
Common Language 
0.005 
[0.029] 
-0.051 
[0.044] 
0.141*** 
[0.044] 
Observations 5,753 5,753 5,753 
R-squared 0.47 0.76 0.71 
Note: This is the same table as Table 6 except that between-effect estimation results are reported. For 
other information see note in Table 6. 
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<Table 7-A> The Gravity Model For Bank Loans: Impact of Lagged Loans and  
Portfolio Assets (Between Effects Estimation) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Short-term Debts  
(lagged) 
0.032*** 
[0.007] 
  
Long-term Debts  
(lagged) 
 
0.020*** 
[0.005] 
 
Equities 
(lagged) 
  
0.015*** 
[0.005] 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
1.000*** 
[0.004] 
0.996*** 
[0.005] 
0.999*** 
[0.005] 
GDP of Source Country 
-0.009** 
[0.004] 
-0.009** 
[0.004] 
-0.009** 
[0.004] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
0.003 
[0.003] 
0.003 
[0.003] 
0.003 
[0.003] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.013 
[0.009] 
0.007 
[0.009] 
0.008 
[0.009] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.011*** 
[0.004] 
0.010*** 
[0.004] 
0.010*** 
[0.004] 
Product of Area Sizes 
0.004* 
[0.002] 
0.003 
[0.002] 
0.003* 
[0.002] 
Distance 
-0.049*** 
[0.005] 
-0.047*** 
[0.005] 
-0.051*** 
[0.005] 
Border 
-0.054** 
[0.026] 
-0.050* 
[0.026] 
-0.053** 
[0.027] 
Colony 
0.029 
[0.020] 
0.034* 
[0.020] 
0.032 
[0.020] 
Common Language 
-0.011 
[0.011] 
-0.01 
[0.011] 
-0.013 
[0.011] 
Observations 5,627 5,627 5,627 
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Note: This is the same table as Table 7 except that between-effect estimation results are reported. For 
other information see note in Table 7. 
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<Table 8-A> The Gravity Model for Portfolio Assets: Impact of Lagged Portfolio Assets 
and Bank Loans (Between Effects Estimation) 
 
 Short-term Debts Long-term Debts Equities 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
0.016** 
[0.006] 
0.004 
[0.005] 
0.024*** 
[0.007] 
Short-term Debts 
(lagged) 
1.003*** 
[0.010] 
  
Long-term Debts 
(lagged) 
 
1.028*** 
[0.005] 
 
Equities 
(lagged) 
  
0.965*** 
[0.007] 
GDP of Source Country 
-0.025*** 
[0.008] 
-0.028*** 
[0.006] 
-0.007 
[0.007] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
-0.011* 
[0.006] 
-0.012*** 
[0.004] 
0.010* 
[0.006] 
Per capita GDP of 
Source country 
0.085*** 
[0.017] 
0.008 
[0.013] 
0.075*** 
[0.017] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.030*** 
[0.006] 
0.030*** 
[0.005] 
0.018*** 
[0.006] 
Product of Area Sizes 
0.012*** 
[0.004] 
0.013*** 
[0.003] 
0.004 
[0.003] 
Distance 
-0.026*** 
[0.009] 
-0.051*** 
[0.007] 
0 
[0.008] 
Border 
-0.06 
[0.039] 
-0.026 
[0.028] 
0.065* 
[0.037] 
Colony 
0.012 
[0.034] 
-0.022 
[0.025] 
-0.035 
[0.033] 
Common Language 
0.008 
[0.023] 
-0.027 
[0.017] 
0.019 
[0.022] 
Observations 2,416 2,416 2,416 
R-squared 0.93 0.99 0.97 
Note: This is the same table as Table 8 except that between-effect estimation results are reported. For 
other information see note in Table 8. 
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<Table 9-A> The Gravity Model for Bank Loans: Impact of Trade, Lagged Loans, and 
Portfolio Assets (Between Effects Estimation) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Trade 
(lagged) 
0.038*** 
[0.007] 
0.037*** 
[0.007] 
0.038*** 
[0.007] 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
0.984*** 
[0.005] 
0.983*** 
[0.005] 
0.986*** 
[0.005] 
Short-term Debts  
(lagged) 
0.027*** 
[0.007] 
  
Long-term Debts  
(lagged) 
 
0.014*** 
[0.005] 
 
Equities 
(lagged) 
  
0.010** 
[0.005] 
GDP of Source Country 
-0.019*** 
[0.004] 
-0.019*** 
[0.004] 
-0.019*** 
[0.004] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
-0.007* 
[0.004] 
-0.007** 
[0.004] 
-0.008** 
[0.004] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.019** 
[0.009] 
0.015 
[0.009] 
0.017* 
[0.009] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.013*** 
[0.004] 
0.012*** 
[0.004] 
0.012*** 
[0.004] 
Product of Area Sizes 
0.005** 
[0.002] 
0.004** 
[0.002] 
0.005** 
[0.002] 
Distance 
-0.039*** 
[0.006] 
-0.038*** 
[0.006] 
-0.040*** 
[0.006] 
Border 
-0.077*** 
[0.027] 
-0.072*** 
[0.027] 
-0.074*** 
[0.027] 
Colony 
0.032 
[0.020] 
0.035* 
[0.020] 
0.034* 
[0.020] 
Common Language 
-0.015 
[0.011] 
-0.015 
[0.011] 
-0.017 
[0.011] 
Observations 5,627 5,627 5,627 
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Note: This is the same table as Table 8 except that between-effect estimation results are reported. For 
other information see note in Table 8.  
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<Table10-A> The Gravity Model for Portfolio Assets: Impact of Trade, Lagged 
Portfolio Assets and Bank Loans (Between Effects Estimation) 
 
 Short-term Debts Long-term Debts Equities 
Trade 
(lagged) 
0.018 
[0.011] 
-0.016* 
[0.009] 
0.020** 
[0.008] 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
0.011 
[0.007] 
0.008 
[0.006] 
-0.001 
[0.005] 
Short-term Debts 
(lagged) 
1.000*** 
[0.011] 
  
Long-term Debts 
(lagged) 
 
1.031*** 
[0.006] 
 
Equities 
(lagged) 
  
0.999*** 
[0.005] 
GDP of Source Country 
-0.031*** 
[0.008] 
-0.023*** 
[0.006] 
-0.011* 
[0.006] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
-0.017** 
[0.007] 
-0.007 
[0.005] 
0.004 
[0.005] 
Per capita GDP of 
Source Country 
0.087*** 
[0.017] 
0.006 
[0.013] 
0.029** 
[0.012] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.031*** 
[0.006] 
0.028*** 
[0.005] 
0.010** 
[0.005] 
Product of Area sizes 
0.013*** 
[0.004] 
0.013*** 
[0.003] 
0.002 
[0.003] 
Distance 
-0.020** 
[0.010] 
-0.057*** 
[0.007] 
0.007 
[0.007] 
Border 
-0.069* 
[0.039] 
-0.018 
[0.029] 
0.042 
[0.028] 
Colony 
0.012 
[0.034] 
-0.021 
[0.025] 
-0.041* 
[0.024] 
Common Language 
0.006 
[0.023] 
-0.024 
[0.017] 
-0.001 
[0.017] 
Observations 2,416 2,416 2,416 
R-squared 0.93 0.99 0.99 
Note: This is the same table as Table 10 except that between-effect estimation results are reported. For 
other information see note in Table 10. 
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<Table 11-A> Determinants of Cross-Border Financial Asset Holding Composition 
(Between Effects Estimation) 
 
 
Bank Loans / 
(Loans + Total Portfolios)
Bank Loans / 
(Loans + Total Debts)
ST Debts / 
Total Debts 
GDP per capita of 
Source Country 
-2.764 
[1.671] 
1.458 
[1.671] 
-8.594** 
[1.068] 
GDP per capita of 
Destination Country
-9.314** 
[1.174] 
-7.308** 
[1.173] 
-1.353 
[0.750] 
Human Capital 
-4.03 
[6.375] 
-0.231 
[6.372] 
-5.716 
[4.072] 
Openness 
8.128** 
[1.742] 
8.734** 
[1.741] 
-2.156 
[1.113] 
Distance 
1.048 
[0.926] 
2.885** 
[0.925] 
-0.33 
[0.591] 
Common Language
-0.923 
[2.393] 
5.225* 
[2.392] 
5.065** 
[1.528] 
Law and Order 
0.401 
[0.901] 
0.584 
[0.900] 
2.367** 
[0.575] 
Observations 
R-squared 
2,125 
0.17 
2,125 
0.12 
2,125 
0.11 
Note: This is the same table as Table 11 except that between-effect estimation results are reported. For 
other information see note in Table 11. 
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<Table 12-A> The Gravity Model for Portfolio Assets: Impact of Bank Loans and ‘Law 
and Order’ (Between Effects Estimation) 
 
 Short-term Debts Long-term Debts Equities 
Bank Loans 
(lagged) 
-0.241*** 
[0.028] 
0.128*** 
[0.044] 
-0.086** 
[0.043] 
Law and Order 
-0.086*** 
[0.013] 
-0.120*** 
[0.021] 
-0.100*** 
[0.020] 
Law and Order * Loans 
0.105*** 
[0.005] 
0.101*** 
[0.009] 
0.140*** 
[0.008] 
GDP of Source Country 
-0.012 
[0.012] 
0.007 
[0.018] 
-0.026 
[0.018] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
0.011 
[0.010] 
0.057*** 
[0.016] 
0.051*** 
[0.016] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.038 
[0.029] 
0.295*** 
[0.046] 
0.340*** 
[0.045] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.012 
[0.012] 
0.139*** 
[0.019] 
0.110*** 
[0.019] 
Product of Area Sizes 
0.024*** 
[0.006] 
0.056*** 
[0.009] 
0.054*** 
[0.009] 
Distance 
-0.044** 
[0.017] 
-0.242*** 
[0.027] 
0.02 
[0.026] 
Border 
0.167** 
[0.075] 
0.101 
[0.118] 
0.362*** 
[0.114] 
Colony 
0.069 
[0.062] 
-0.248** 
[0.097] 
-0.176* 
[0.094] 
Common Language 
-0.011 
[0.035] 
-0.054 
[0.054] 
0.172*** 
[0.053] 
Observations 4,785 4,785 4,785 
R-squared 0.55 0.76 0.74 
Note: This is the same table as Table 12 except that between-effect estimation results are reported. For 
other information see note in Table 12. 
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<Table 13-A> The Gravity Model for Bank Loans: Impact of Portfolio Assets and ‘Law 
and Order’ (Between Effects Estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Short-term Debts 
(lagged) 
1.312*** 
[0.208]   
Law and Order 
*Short-term Debts 
-0.093** 
[0.039]   
Long-term Debts 
(lagged)  
0.701*** 
[0.060]  
Law and Order 
*Long-term Debts  
-0.008 
[0.011]  
Equities 
(lagged)   
0.862*** 
[0.075] 
Law and Order 
*Equities   
-0.043*** 
[0.014] 
Law and Order -0.024 [0.022] 
0.002 
[0.021] 
-0.031 
[0.020] 
GDP of Source Country 0.374*** [0.022] 
0.287*** 
[0.020] 
0.313*** 
[0.020] 
GDP of Destination 
Country 
0.357*** 
[0.018] 
0.257*** 
[0.017] 
0.269*** 
[0.017] 
Per capita GDP of Source 
Country 
0.453*** 
[0.049] 
0.141*** 
[0.045] 
0.145*** 
[0.046] 
Per capita GDP of 
Destination Country 
0.093*** 
[0.023] 
-0.012 
[0.021] 
0.016 
[0.021] 
Product of Area Sizes -0.044*** [0.012] 
-0.060*** 
[0.010] 
-0.056*** 
[0.010] 
Distance -0.253*** [0.031] 
-0.110*** 
[0.028] 
-0.274*** 
[0.028] 
Border 0.545*** [0.141] 
0.447*** 
[0.124] 
0.267** 
[0.128] 
Colony 0.774*** [0.119] 
0.831*** 
[0.105] 
0.822*** 
[0.107] 
Common Language 0.277*** [0.066] 
0.236*** 
[0.059] 
0.085 
[0.060] 
Observations 4,943 4,943 4,943 
R-Squared 0.73 0.79 0.78 
Note: This is the same table as Table 13 except that between-effect estimation results are reported. For 
other information see note in Table 13. 
